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Abstract 
Platform envelopment describes a competitive move whereby a digital platform enters an adjacent market. 
On one hand, it might enable to dethrone an established platform. On the other hand, it might give rise to 
the creation of platform conglomerates, which increases the concentration of private power. Therefore, 
platform envelopment has recently attracted significant attention from regulators and scholars. However, 
the traditional view of platform envelopment does not consider recent platform envelopment practices 
observed in research and practice. In this study, we aim to determine and structure the complexity of 
platform envelopment. We investigated 20 cases and developed a taxonomy of platform envelopment. We 
further encoded these cases into the comprehensive taxonomy and derived platform envelopment patterns 
and particularities. Our work contributes to research by establishing a foundation for the conceptual 
understanding of platform envelopment. Regulators can use this taxonomy to classify platform 
envelopment cases and determine potentially anti-competitive conduct. 
Keywords 
Digital platforms, platform envelopment, envelopment patterns, taxonomy, case study. 
Introduction 
“Platform envelopment,” a term coined by Eisenmann et al. (2011), describes the competitive behavior of a 
digital platform whereby it enters an adjacent market already served by an established platform. By tying 
together services in the origin market with those offered in the adjacent market, the enveloper creates a 
multi-platform bundle and forcecloses user access to the established platform. Platform envelopment is, 
however, a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enables a new platform to dethrone an established 
platform (Suarez and Kirtley 2012). The resulting changes in platform leadership might foster the 
development of technological discontinuities (Tushman and Anderson 1986) that allow new markets and 
services to emerge (Bower and Christensen 1995). On the other hand, platform envelopment can promote 
the creation of platform conglomerates, as witnessed by giant platform operators such as Amazon, Alibaba, 
and Google, which leads to the concentration of private power (Clemons et al. 2019; Moore and Tambini 
2018; Wu 2018). This increases the likelihood that the interests of a few platform conglomerates will steer 
collective outcomes by becoming too big to fail and too big to regulate (Zuboff 2019). Such platform 
conglomerates also surround themselves with so-called “kill zones”—sectors not worth investing in, since 
defeat is guaranteed (Kamepalli et al. 2020)—thereby reducing venture capitalists’ willingness to fund 
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competitive startups (Khan 2016), which ultimately reduces consumer choice and inhibits effective 
competition. 
While platform envelopment as proposed by Eisenmann et al. (2011) helps to explain competition between 
rival platforms (e.g., Windows and Internet Explorer versus Netscape), it does not take into account the 
recent platform envelopment practices that have been observed in the literature as well as in practice. The 
theory neither incorporates the envelopment of orchestrated complementors, be it digital platforms (Kang 
2017), physical products (Zhu and Liu 2018), or digital services (Foerderer et al. 2018), nor does it delve 
into the versatile role of, and the mechansmis used by, a core platform to interfere with its rivals—by 
rejecting updates (Kafka 2016), promoting its own platform through self-preferencing (Khan 2016), or 
supporting inter-platform integration (Li and Agarwal 2016). Moreover, this theory does not account for 
different digital platform types such as innovation and transaction platforms. 
Besides increasing scholarly attention, these types of envelopment are also increasingly attracting 
regulatory scrutiny. For example, Amazon is currently being investigated for merchant mining and 
enveloping bestselling items (European Commission 2019) and Apple for enveloping music streaming 
(European Parliament 2019) and mobile payment (CPI 2019). Apple has for example rejected Spotify’s 
updates in the AppStore multiple times (Kafka 2016) and only recently granted Spotify access to Siri, which 
is a crucial interface to reach customers (Spotify 2019). However, Apple is still blocking Spotify from being 
available as the default music player (Spotify 2019). Similarly, Apple is blocking access to the iPhone’s 
contactless payments chip called the Near-Field Communication interface. 
Our objective is, therefore, to capture and synthesize the versatility of platform envelopment and 
systematically identify its distinct characteristics and conceptual strucutures, augmenting the explanatory 
power of platform envelopment theory and initiating further theory-building. This is particularly important 
because taxonomies enable deeper understanding and analysis of complex domains (Nickerson et al. 2013), 
such as platform envelopment dynamics. For research purposes, a taxonomy provides an organizing 
structure for a body of knowledge. Specifically, in the case of platform envelopment, a taxonomy provides 
the groundwork for better understanding the strategic behavior of, and dynamics among, the different types 
of entities involved and the mechanisms used in platform envelopment. Policy scholars can use this 
proposed taxonomy to develop new regulatory policies for platforms, economists can investigate the welfare 
gains and losses of different envelopment practices, and strategy scholars can develop strategies on how 
established platforms can defend themselves against different types of envelopment. In practice, the 
proposed taxonomy offers an analytical framework for policymakers, envelopers, and defenders. The 
decomposition of complex envelopment practices allows policymakers to more fully understand where and 
in which form different types of envelopment become anti-competitive conduct. The taxnomy supports 
envelopers strategizing about different trade-offs, such as interfering with versus taking a laissez-faire 
approach to a target platform and defenders can use it to assess enveloper threats and derive competition-
driven repositioning. 
Therefore, this paper aims to answer the following research question: What dimensions and characteristics 
distinguish the various types of platform envelopment? This study contributes to the call for developing a 
taxonomy for the purpose of distinguishing between digital platform types (Constantinides et al. 2018; de 
Reuver et al. 2018). To fill the existing void in the literature, this article creates a taxonomy for platform 
envelopment and establishes its characteristic patterns and particularities. In the next section, we outline 
the theoretical background upon which this taxonomy is based. Subsequently, we present a three-step 
research approach that consists: of (1) creating a case base, (2) developing a taxonomy based on the 
identified cases and extant literature, and (3) empirically deriving platform envelopment patterns and 
particularities by applying the taxonomy to the selected cases. Finally, we discuss the anti-competitive 
outcomes and practices promoted by platform envelopment and potential regulatory remedies 
Related Work 
Types of Digital Platforms. In general, digital platforms encompass two types: transaction 
platforms and innovation platforms (Cusumano et al. 2019; Schreieck et al. 2016). Transaction 
platforms operate as intermediaries between two or more user groups and facilitate transactions for users 
to share, trade, or access a variety of goods and services (Cusumano et al. 2019). These platforms create 
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value by enabling the interactions of distinct user groups (Hermes et al. 2019; Rochet and Tirole 2003). 
Usually, the value of users increases with the number of users on the other side of the platform (Caillaud 
and Jullien 2003), a phenomenon referred to as indirect network effects (de Reuver et al. 2018). While the 
concept of transaction platforms can be found in various non-digital business models, digital technology 
enables the efficient scaling of such platforms. By contrast, innovation platforms “consist of common 
technological building blocks that the owner and ecosystem partners can share in order to create new 
complementary products and services, such as smartphone apps […]” (Cusumano et al. 2019). Innovation 
platforms leverage three key features: the platform core, boundary resources, and complements. Along with 
users and complementors, these features refer to the platform ecosystem. The platform core is usually 
owned by the platform leader and described as an extensible code base that provides basic functionality to 
modular services (Tiwana et al. 2010). Each modular service is a software sub-system capable of extending 
the functionality of the platform core (Baldwin and Woodard 2009). Boundary resources (Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson 2013) are interfacing and supporting resources, such as application programming interfaces 
(APIs), software development kits, and online marketplaces, that allow the platform leader to orchestrate 
complementary innovation by co-creating value with external complementors (Hein et al. 2019b). While 
complementors are the actors that develop, for example, applications or hardware, complements refer to 
the individual apps or hardware themselves (Hein et al. 2019a). 
Platform Envelopment. Eisenmann et al. (2011) proposed platform envelopment as a new approach 
to how platforms can overcome barriers to entry and conquer other platform-mediated markets. 
Eisenmann et al. (2011) define platform envelopment as the “entry by one platform provider into another’s 
market by bundling its own platform’s functionality with that of the target’s so as to leverage shared user 
relationships and common components.” Hence, the enveloper ties its services in the origin market with 
those offered in the targeted market and creates a multi-platform bundle that leverages shared user 
relationships. In the next step, the enveloper forecloses the target platform access to the core platform and 
users and thereby captures the network effects of the target platform (Cennamo 2019). 
A related stream of platform envelopment research extends Eisenmann et al.'s (2011) original 
conceptualization to explore the envelopment of complementary platforms (Foerderer et al. 2018; Kang 
2017; Li and Agarwal 2016; Wen and Zhu 2019). This stream understands platform envelopment as 
platform owners entering their ecosystem by either developing applications on their own or acquiring third-
party applications, thereby competing directly with their complementors. Kang (2017), for example, studied 
the coopetitive dynamics between Google’s launch of Google Fit and complementary health tracking 
applications on Android and defines such intra-platform envelopment as “the platform owner’s action of 
releasing a product whose functionality overlaps with that of the products already offered by platform 
complementors.” Similarly, Li and Agarwal (2016) investigated the effect of Facebook’s acquisition and 
integration of Instagram on complementary markets and revealed the trade-off of intra-platform 
envelopment. On the one hand, it allows integration efficiency between the core platform and the new 
platform. On the other hand, it discourages third-parties from contributing to the ecosystem as they fear 
the platform owner will capture their rents. 
All in all, platform owners leverage the synergies of the core and the new platform by generating super-
additive (Schreieck et al. 2019) and super-modular value (Jacobides et al. 2018) for consumers. Thus, after 
envelopment, the value of a multi-platform bundle becomes greater than the sum of the values of the 
individual constituent platforms. These interactions not only increase value for the consumer, they also 
enable the collection of a vast amount of data, which empowers the platform to leverage data across 
business lines to further expand its competitive position (Khan 2016; van Dijck et al. 2019). 
Methodology 
Since the theory on platform envelopment (Eisenmann et al. 2011) does not take into account contemporary 
envelopment practices, a case-based approach with various platform envelopment cases is most fitting (Yin 
2017). Multiple, qualitative case studies provide an opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding (Yin, 
2014) as well as conduct generalizable, cross-case analyses (Larsson 1993). Our methodology has three 
phases. First, we set up a case base comprised of 20 platform envelopment cases. The unit of analysis for 
these cases is the platform, not the platform company itself. Second, we developed a taxonomy in three 
iterations: (1) developing a preliminary taxonomy based on extant literature, (2) finalizing the taxonomy 
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based on the empirical cases, and (3) evaluating the taxonomy based on additional cases. In the last step, 
we derived platform envelopment patterns and particularities via qualitative cluster analyses as a cross-
case analysis (Yin 2017) using constant comparison (Eisenhardt 1989; Weking et al. 2019b). 
Creating a Case Base. Our method for case collection built upon the work of Larsson (1993). First, 
we identified cases with which we were already familiar. Second, we conducted a case search to identify new 
cases. The case search consisted of different search strategies and sources, which helped to reduce case 
collection bias (Larsson 1993). We relied on extant literature (e.g. Edelman and Lai 2016; Eisenmann et al. 
2011; Foerderer et al. 2018; Iacobucci and Ducci 2019) as well as on business reports, news articles, and 
websites. To find these potential sources, we used web searches and scientific databases. We considered all 
active cases that involved platform envelopment and for which sufficient information was available. We 
aimed to capture a variety of platform envelopment practices such as internal development versus 
acquisition (Li and Agarwal 2016), envelopment of complementors (Zhu and Liu 2018) versus competitors, 
intervening with the target (Spotify 2019) versus taking a laissez-faire approach, and enveloping by 
leveraging control over an operating system (European Commission 2018) versus an online service 
(European Commission 2017). We identified 20 cases in total. We stored all data in a central case base (Yin 
2017) and tried to find additional sources for each case. When possible, we triangulated the data by 
synthesizing the findings from all sources for a case, which helped us to build a more profound 
understanding. Such data triangulation helps to increase the construct validity of a case study (Yin 2017). 
Table 1 provides a list of all cases. 
Table 1: Overview of Cases Analyzed 
Iteration Core Platform New Entity Analyzed Sources 
Second Iteration: 14 relevant 
envelopment cases 
Airbnb Airbnb Adventures 4 
Amazon Marketplace Third-party products 6 
Android  Google Photos 6 
LinkedIn  Job Listings 5 
Windows  Internet Explorer 7 
Android  Google Fit 6 
Android  Google Chrome 4 
Google Search Google Hotel 5 
Google Search  Google Shopping 7 
Facebook  Instagram 6 
App Store  Apple Music 4 
iPhone  Apple Health 5 
Facebook  WhatsApp 4 
Spotify Ringer 5 
Third Iteration: Six relevant 
envelopment cases 
Android Google Search 6 
Uber Uber Eats 4 
Google Search Google Flight 5 
iPhone Apple Pay 5 
iOS Apple Music 4 
Fire OS Prime 4 
 
Developing a Taxonomy. We applied the iterative method of Nickerson et al. (2013) for the purpose 
of taxonomy development. This method has proven in several information systems studies to derive 
valuable knowledge about underlying organizing structures (e.g. Weking et al. 2019a). Moreover, it follows 
a holistic approach to successfully combine theoretical knowledge and empirical insight. In the first step, 
we defined two meta-characteristics (MCs) based on the concept of platform envelopment proposed by 
Eisenmann et al. (2011): core platform and new platform. Next, we used the eight objective and five 
subjective ending conditions utilized by Nickerson et al. (2013) for terminating the iterative method. For 
example, Nickerson et al. (2013) proposed checking after each iteration if “at least one object is classified 
under every characteristics of every dimension” (objective) and if “the number of dimensions allow the 
taxonomy to be meaningful without being […] overwhelming” (subjective). Then, we iteratively developed 
the taxonomy. In the first iteration, we applied the conceptual-to-empirical approach and derived 
dimensions and characteristics based on extant literature. The second iteration consisted of the empirical-
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to-conceptual approach whereby we applied the taxonomy to 14 case studies and conducted a qualitative 
structured data analysis (Miles et al. 2013). We coded the case information and empirically derived 
characteristics (within-case analysis) (Yin 2017). Then, we classified the cases within the taxonomy and, if 
necessary, added further characteristics and dimensions to the taxonomy until all cases were included. For 
example, we reframed the MC “new platform” to “new entity” to deal with the fact that it is not only 
platforms that get enveloped but also physical products and digital services. Table 2 provides an overview 
of how qualitative raw data were aggregated into the taxonomy. 
Table 2: Exemplary Coding Extract 
Source Relevant paragraph Taxonomy 
dimension 
Taxonomy 
characteristic 
(Li and 
Agarwal 
2016) 
• “After the acquisition, Facebook 
continued to run Instagram as an 
independent application […].” 
• “[…] a partial integration was made […] 
between Instagram and Facebook.“ 
• Origin 
• Availability 
• Relationship with the 
core 
• Acquired 
• Outside of core platform 
ecosystem 
• Simple integration 
 
We dropped and synthesized characteristics and dimensions to keep the taxonomy lean without losing 
discriminative power. The third iteration also applied the empirical-to-conceptual approach. We used the 
taxonomy to code an additional six cases (Miles et al. 2013). Again, we used multiple sources and 
triangulated the data to corroborate results (Yin 2017). The analysis and comparison of the cases did not 
require adding or modifying any of the characteristics or dimensions. All of the other ending conditions 
were met. We, therefore, stopped the process as the resulting taxonomy can be applied to all cases. 
Derivation of Platform Envelopment Patterns. The platform envelopment patterns have been 
derived using a qualitative analysis approach. First, we encoded the cases in a matrix in which each row of 
the matrix represented a case and each column represented a dimension in the taxonomy. Each cell, then, 
represented the specific characteristic of each case for a chosen dimension. Based on the matrix, we 
performed a qualitative cluster analysis as a cross-case analysis (Yin 2017) using constant comparison 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). The analysis of similarities and differences across cases revealed three 
platform envelopment patterns and four sub-patterns as well as two platform envelopment particularities. 
Results 
Taxonomy. The derived taxonomy for platform envelopment actors consists of four MCs and 11 
dimensions with two to four distinct characteristics for each. Table 3 illustrates the taxonomy structure. 
Table 3: A Taxonomy of Platform Envelopment 
MC Dimension Characteristics 
C
o
re
 p
la
tf
o
rm
 Type of platform Innovation platform Transaction platform 
Envelopment direction Vertical Horizontal 
Position in layered 
architecture 
Hardware and 
Operating System 
Operating System Online Service 
Target Competitor Complementor 
Interaction with target Interference Laissez-faire 
Market dominance Yes No 
N
ew
 e
n
ti
ty
 
Type of entity Innovation 
platform 
Transaction 
platform 
Digital service Physical 
product 
Origin Self-developed Acquired 
Part of platform 
conglomerate 
Yes – 
exponential super-additive value 
No –  
limited super-additive value 
Availability Inside of core platform 
ecosystem 
Outside of core 
platform ecosystem 
Inside and outside of 
core platform 
ecosystem 
Relationship with core 
platform 
Simple Integration Self-preferencing Pure Bundle 
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Platform Envelopment Patterns. We identified three patterns and four sub-patterns for platform 
envelopment. At the highest level, we differentiated between horizontal envelopment of platform 
competitors (Pattern 1), vertical envelopment of platform competitors (Pattern 2), and vertical 
envelopment of platform complementors (Pattern 3). We refer to competitors as entities that are not 
orchestrated through boundary resources by the enveloper. Vertical envelopment refers to enveloping 
entities that represent one side of a transaction platform (e.g., moving from general search to specialized 
search) or that are part of the ecosystem of an innovation platform (e.g., moving from mobile operating 
systems to apps). In contrast, horizontal envelopment refers to enveloping entities outside of the platform’s 
direct network. For Pattern 1 and Pattern 3, we identified two sub-patterns. For Pattern 1 we differentiated 
between internal and external envelopment and for Pattern 3 between soft and radical envelopment. 
1. Horizontal Envelopment of Platform Competitors (n = 5). The first pattern refers to platform 
competition between the new platform and the target platform. No specific relationship exists between the 
core platform and the target platform. The core platform thereby moves into the space of horizontally 
competing platforms by integrating a new platform to offer the same value proposition to the targeted 
market. This type of envelopment does not comprise self-preference or bundling practices and follows a 
laissez-faire interaction with the target platform. Internal Envelopment refers to the phenomenon in which 
a new platform is only available inside of a core platform. Airbnb, for example, aims to envelop 
TripAdvisor’s platform by integrating similar platform functionality of Airbnb Adventures into its core 
accommodation-sharing platform. Similarly, Spotify is acquiring The Ringer to integrate additional 
podcasts into its core music streaming platform. External Envelopment refers to the phenomenon whereby 
a new platform is only available outside of a core platform. Facebook, for example, acquired WhatsApp and 
offers it independently of its own app center and social network. Similarly, Uber built UberEats and 
operates it as a standalone platform independent of its core ride-hailing platform. 
2. Vertical Envelopment of Platform Competitors (n = 4). The second pattern refers to platform 
competition between the new platform and the target platform as well. The core platform is used by the 
target platform to reach users. The core platform thereby moves into the space of vertically competing 
platforms by self-preferencing a self-developed or an acquired platform in order to offer the same value 
proposition to the targeted market. This type of envelopment uses self-preferencing practices (such as 
higher rankings and prominent placements) as well as interference mechanisms (such as demoting rivals, 
algorithmic opacity, and limiting interoperability) to envelop vertical platform competitors. A typical 
example is Google Search and Google Shopping (European Commission 2017; Iacobucci and Ducci 2019). 
In this case, Google Search, as a dominant entry point for consumers to online information, is leveraged for 
prominent Google Shopping placement and to demote rivals in its search results. According to the European 
Commission (2017), Google abused the algorithmic black box of Google Search and included criteria to 
deliberately demote competing services such as Foundem (Manne 2018).  
3. Vertical Envelopment of Platform Complementors (n = 9). The third pattern refers to platform 
competition in a coopetitive setting. While the target platform complements the core platform, it competes 
with the new platform at the same time. The core platform thereby moves into the space of a vertically 
complementing platform to offer the same value proposition to the targeted market. This can happen in two 
ways. Soft Envelopment refers to the phenomenon by which the enveloper offers a new platform but does 
not use its core platform to self-preference or bundle its new platform, nor does the core platform interfere 
with complementary platforms. Hence, the platform company launches the new platform and simply 
integrates it with its core platform without further using its core to jump start its new platform. Google’s 
launch of Google Fit provides an example of this sub-pattern (Kang 2017). Radical Envelopment refers to 
the phenomenon by which the enveloper offers a new platform and uses its core platform to self-preference 
or bundle its new platform and interfere with target platforms. Hence, the core platform deliberately 
privileges its new platform and deliberately aims to block target platforms. The current battle between 
Apple and Spotify illustrates this pattern (European Parliament 2019). Apple, for example, pre-installs 
Apple Music on its iPhone operating system (iOS), sets Apple Music as the default for Siri, and disregards 
its own App Store rules (Spotify 2019). At the same time, Apple uses its App Store policies to reject updates 
from Spotify and uses control over its iOS to delay Spotify’s access to Apple’s smart watch and smart speaker 
(Spotify 2019). 
Platform Envelopment Particularities. We identified two platform envelopment particularities 
that support the finding that not only are digital platforms being enveloped, but so are physical products 
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and digital services. The envelopment of physical products (n = 1) refers to the phenomenon wherein 
a digital transaction platform enters into a third-party sellers’ product space to compete against them 
directly. Thus, the platform itself resells third-party products in its own marketplace. This form of 
envelopment allows the enveloper to leverage economies of scale, which it can use to reap higher profits or 
lower costs for consumers (Zhu and Liu 2018). The related case stems from Amazon, which uses its 
marketplace to envelop the product spaces of its complementors (European Commission 2019; Zhu and Liu 
2018). In contrast, the envelopment of digital services (n = 1) refers to the phenomenon in which a 
digital innovation platform enters its ecosystem to envelop existing digital services already provided by its 
complementors. Therefore, the platform itself now offers the service that had previously been solely offered 
by its complementors. This approach also reflects vertical envelopment, but targets a different type of 
complementor than traditional platform envelopment. This form of envelopment allows the enveloper to 
leverage new data streams to improve its competitiveness. The related case stems from Google, which 
released its photo app in 2015 (Foerderer et al. 2018).  
Discussion, Limitations, and Future Research 
Our findings suggest two interdependent areas for regulatory discussion: vertical envelopment and anti-
competitive envelopment practices. While vertical envelopment reduces the revenue of complementors and 
can, therefore, induce them to leave the platform, it also offers multiple advantages to the platform owner. 
Vertical envelopment offers the possibility of capturing the rents of complementors and competitors, 
increasing integration efficiencies (Li and Agarwal 2016), creating super-additive and modular value 
(Jacobides et al. 2018; Schreieck et al. 2019), and controlling platform evolution. By leveraging vertical 
envelopment, platform owners are increasingly converging towards platform conglomeration. Platform 
conglomerates not only profit from network effects and winner-take-all dynamics, they also profit from self-
reinforcing data feedback loops, meaning that they can leverage data from one platform to improve another 
platform or to build a superior platform. Such platform conglomerate advantages enable platform owners 
to sustain market dominance in their core platform(s) and easily establish new dominant platforms, 
harnessing even more data and reinforcing the feedback loop (Khan 2016; van Dijck et al. 2019). As a result, 
traditional incumbents as well as startups that do not profit from these advantages lack critical consumer 
and market knowledge and big data sets to leverage new technologies such as artificial intelligence. Hence, 
platform conglomerate advantage impedes new market entry, creates immense barriers to entry, increases 
the concentration of private power, and restricts effective competition. 
Aside from the problems of vertical envelopment, our results also illustrate how envelopment practices can 
be anti-competitive. From the perspective of the core platform, two types of envelopment practices should 
be considered: first, how to treat complementors and competitiors, and second, how to treat the new 
platform. Amazon, for example, uses standard agreements with independent sellers on its platform to 
collect and analyze their transaction data (European Commission 2019). This allows Amazon to identify 
successfully selling products or products that Amazon could help to improve by integrating them with 
complementary Amazon services. At the same time, Amazon can use its control over the marketplace to 
easily promote these products and demote competing ones. Since Amazon is also one of the largest 
marketplaces, it can sell large amounts of these products and thereby builds up significant bargaining power 
towards the suppliers of these products (Foerderer et al. 2018). By exploiting its bargaining power, Amazon 
can sell these products at a lower cost, outcompeting the product complementors and further strengthening 
its market dominance. While Amazon is under regulatory scrutiny for such practices (European 
Commission 2019), Google has already been fined for similar practices such as tying, prominent placement, 
and demotion of rivals (European Commission 2017; European Commission 2018) and Apple is also under 
investigation for limiting interoperability (European Parliament 2019) and denying access to its NFC chip 
for mobile payments (CPI 2019). 
Instead of scrutinizing and regulating single anti-competitive practices, we propose reevaluating the 
concept of vertical envelopment. Our findings suggest that vertical envelopment leads to conflicts of 
interest, for example, Amazon owning and participating in its own marketplace, Google owning general 
search and participating in specialized search, or Apple owning the App Store and participating in its own 
ecosystem. These vertical envelopments create tensions that often involve anti-competitive conduct, either 
between the core platform and the target or the core platform and the new entity. Related industries, such 
as American banking, faced similar challenges in the past. As a result, banking laws were changed to require 
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the separation of banking and commerce (Shull 1999) and prohibit banks from entering markets other than 
those in the business of banking. The laws are maintained to ensure the fair and efficient allocation of credit, 
prevent the concentration of power in the banking industry and counteract possible anti-competitive 
banking practices (Khan 2016). Similar to banks, platform conglomerates are prone to concentration and 
conflicts of interest. Moreover, their core platforms can be considered critical infrastructure (e.g., Amazon’s 
marketplace or Google Search). Therefore, in order to limit these issues, it might be worth drawing on 
related laws and considering banning or restricting vertical envelopment practices. 
Our work contributes to platform research by extending the original theory on platform envelopment by 
integrating: (1) the view of intra-platform envelopment and (2) how a core platform interacts with new and 
target platforms. Our taxonomy, thereby, augments the boundaries of platform envelopment and eases the 
differentiation between other platform entry strategies (Karhu and Ritala 2020). Regulators can use our 
taxonomy to classify platform envelopment cases for the purpose of deriving potential anti-competitive 
conduct. While this taxonomy cannot be used to identify anti-competitive conduct per se, it can enable the 
early identification of cases that might be prone to anti-competitive behavior. For example, the taxonomy’s 
patterns reveal that radical platform envelopment and vertical envelopment of platform competitiors is, for 
the most part, accompanied by anti-competitve conduct. In addition, this taxonomy can assist in the 
determination of whether potentially anti-competitive conduct is occurring between the core platform and 
the new platform or between the core platform and the target platform. Envelopers can this the taxonomy 
to formulate strategies and make decisions regarding various trade-offs and the associated risks, such as 
acquiring a target platform (integration risk) versus building its own platform (risk of late entry), or 
interfering with a target platform (risk of regulatory scrutinity) versus taking a laissez-faire approach to 
the target platform (risk of single-homing and failing to solve the chicken-and-egg problem). Defenders can 
use the taxonomy to assess the threat of platform owner entry (e.g., soft versus radical envelopment) and 
derive competition-driven repositing (Wen and Zhu 2019). 
This study has several limitations. First, we use products/platforms as unit of analysis which reflects our 
framing of vertical and horizontal envelopment. We regard for example the move from a core platform (e.g. 
iOS) into its complementary market (e.g. music streaming apps) as vertical envelopment. Other 
conceptualizations are possible. For example, Apple’s selling of the iPhone (including Hardware, iOS, and 
the AppStore) can be regarded as one line of business and Apple’s move into music streaming as another 
line of business. Thus, it is possible to argue that Apple is horizontally integrating and only uses one line of 
business (iPhone) to distribute and sell another horizontal line of business (music streaming). Second, the 
taxonomy has not been externally validated by confirmatory expert interviews or focus groups. Third, the 
taxonomy has been developed with the aim to theoretical understand the versatility of platform 
envelopment and therefore incorporates as diverse cases as possible. Changes to corporate conduct (such 
as Google unbundling its shopping service from search) are not reflected in the cases. Finally, platform 
envelopment is a dynamic interplay whereas the taxonomy is limited to a static point of view. 
Our review of existing literature reveals that most scholars take the perspective of the enveloper. Within 
this perspective, future work can draw on the three patterns identified herein and investigate their 
performance. Previous envelopment cases have indicated that not all envelopment attacks are successful so 
it is fruitful to better understand why some envelopment strategies succeed and others do not. Since 
platform envelopment is dynamic in nature, the author’s call for longitudinal studies to reveal how changes 
in strategic behavior influence envelopment performance. Besides extending our understanding of the 
enveloper, we propose future research to take the perspective of policymakers, consumers, and defenders 
in addition to envelopers. Future work on platform regulation can use our taxonomy and patterns to derive 
new policies such as restricting vertical envelopment and prohibiting interference. Future work should 
thereby assess which policy interventions might limit potentially anti-competitive conduct without 
reducing the efficiencies generated by platform conglomeration. Future work taking the consumer 
perspective into account is encouraged to explore the impact of platform envelopment on consumer welfare. 
While recent work indicates that platform envelopment can reduce innovation and increase prices as well 
as shift innovation to new apps (Wen and Zhu 2019), the question remains whether the welfare gain is 
larger than the welfare loss. Lastly, we encourage an exploration of the target’s perspective to analyze their 
strategic defensive moves against envelopment attacks. Case studies and configurational analyses might 
reveal which interplay of factors is most suitable to fending off envelopment attacks. 
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